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I. INTRODUCTION
Fire fighters and fire marshals testified that the fire started in the southeast corner
of the 436 Main building. Origin and cause experts hired by the 436 Main owner, Melva
Garcia, combed the building for two days and came to the same conclusion. So did an
electrical engineer hired by 436 Main. An origin and cause expert hired by 438 Main
came to the same conclusion. Even defendants' expert agreed that the only ignition
source in that corner was defendants' energized heat cable, burned remnants of which
were found nailed to a wood fascia board.
Despite this evidence, the trial court summarily concluded that the heat cable did
not start the fire. He did not explain where it started or why he did not believe
eyewitnesses, fire fighters, fire marshals or fire investigators. The court's conclusion was
wrong for three reasons. First, under Ut.R.Civ.P., Rule 41(b), the court wrongfully relied
on the defendants' evidence, instead of looking solely to the plaintiffs' evidence to
determine if plaintiffs stated a prima facie case. Had he correctly not considered
defendants' evidence, he would have concluded that the plaintiffs stated a prima facie
case, and allowed the trial to continue. Second, the Findings were conclusory, scant and
legally insufficient. Third, the Findings were against the clear weight of the evidence.
In addition, the court wrongfully considered negligence concepts in deciding
whether the plaintiffs had proven a prima facie strict liability claim. Had the court
correctly excluded negligence concepts, he would have correctly determined that the
plaintiffs had stated a prima facie strict liability claim. In sum, the court's Findings and

1

Conclusions were contrary to law and were so fraught with error that a retrial is
necessary.
II. ARGUMENT
A.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW ARE INSUFFICIENT.1
1.

Plaintiffs Specifically Objected to the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

Plaintiffs preserved for appeal the argument that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Findings") are legally insufficient. Plaintiffs filed Objections to
the Findings, stating that as a whole "the Findings . . . . are inaccurate and incomplete."
(R. 6469.) Plaintiffs argued that the "Findings should be rejected/' and that the trial court
should "be ordered to prepare accurate Findings . . . ." (R. 6472.) In a later hearing, the
trial court asked plaintiffs to clarify their objections.2 (June 29, 2000 Transcript,

1

Withou1 citation to any law, defendants contend plaintiffs erred in identifying the
issues and standards of review differently in their Brief than in the Docketing Statement.
Appellees Easy Heat, Inc. and Heron Cable Industries, Ltd.'s Brief ("Appellees' Brief)
at 3-4. This Court takes a different view. "The docketing statement is for the benefit of
the court, not the appellee." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1996).
Consequently, an appellant is not limited to the issues as expressed in the docketing
statement; even an omission of issues from a docketing statement does not doom the
appellant's case or prohibit the Court from considering issues raised and briefed. Id.
2

THE COURT: "Mr. Morse, just so I'm clear, then, the objection is not so much
that these are not adequately reflecting what happened at trial in terms of the conclusions
that I reached, but you're objecting to the - - there is not a great basis to make those
fmding[s] in the first place."
MR. MORSE: "That's right your honor, I just disputed some of the evidentiaiy
bases for that, whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence, and the some of the legal conclusions that flow from them . . . . I want to make sure that I don't
2

supplemented by stipulation.) In ruling on the objections, the trial judge specifically
"note[ed] for the record that Mr. Morse's objections as to the legal basis and factual
basis for those [Findings] are to be considered preserved." (Id.) (emphasis supplied).
Defendants' counsel acknowledged that plaintiffs had preserved these issues for appeal.3
Plaintiffs adequately objected to the legally insufficient Findings.
2.

Failure of the Trial Court to Produce Legally Sufficient Findings
is Reversible Error.

Failure by the trial court to prepare logical and adequate findings is grounds for
this Court to grant a new trial. Defendants assert plaintiffs' reliance on Acton v. Deliran,
737 P.2d 996 (Utah 1987) is misplaced. See Appellees' Brief at 8. Defendants assert that
the complete absence of Findings on a material issue is not reversible error. See
Appellees' Brief at 9 (citing State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 788 n.6 (Utah 1991)).4
However, in Armed Forces Insurance Exchange v. Harrison, 2003 UT 14, ^[28,
this Court recently reaffirmed Acton, stressing the importance of adequate findings.
In Harrison this Court stated, "[f]or findings of fact to be adequate, they must show that
the court's judgment or decree flows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence."
Id. (quoting Acton, 131 P.2d at 999). Furthermore, the findings "'should be sufficiently
waive anything that's why I objected to these . . . conclusions." (June 29, 2000 H.T., at 67.)
defendants' counsel stated, "I think I may agree with him that they're [plaintiffs'
objections to Findings of Fact] preserved regardless of whether he objects to these
findings or not." (June 29, 2000 H.T. at 6.)
4

In Ramirez, this Court vacated the conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial based upon a lack of adequate findings. 817 P.2d at 788-89.
3

detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.5" Id. (emphasis in original). This Court
held, "[t]he absence of these findings by the trial court 'is a fundamental defect that
makes it impossible to review issues that were briefed without invading the trial court's
fact-finding domain.'" Id. at If 37 (quoting Acton, 737 P.2d at 999) (emphasis supplied).
This Court then remanded the case to the trial court. Id, Defendants' claim that plaintiffs
mistakenly rely upon Acton is wrong.
3.

It is Not This Court's Role to Comb the Record for Evidence
Supporting the Trial Court's Findings.

Defendants assert that this Court may stray outside the Findings to assess the
adequacy of the trial court's Findings. Appellees' Brief at 9, 10-11. It is not this Court's
responsibility to search out the record to determine whether any evidence supports the
incomplete Findings. This Court should not assume the role of the trial court. In Bailey
v. Bayles, 2003 UT 58,ffif18-22, 52 P.3d 1158, this Court held that the Court of Appeals
had erred when it affirmed a trial court's findings by relying upon record evidence
because the Court of Appeals should have constrained itself to the trial court's findings.
By relying on more than the findings, "the court of appeals assumed the role of fact finder
and in so doing exceeded its proper role." Id. at 1f 22.
The same rule applies here: the Court must focus only upon the trial court's
Findings. After a seven-day trial that focused mainly on where this fire started, the trial
court simply "found," "[t]he ADKS roof deicing cable was not the proximate cause of the
fire at 436 Main." (R. 6671.) Defendants assert that the record adequately supports this
4

Finding. Appellee's Brief at 11-12. Defendants also go to great lengths to rehabilitate
the trial court's Findings. See Appellee's Brief at 10-14. The Findings are cursory and
not "sufficiently detailed." They do not include sufficient "subsidiary facts to disclose
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached."
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 Ut. App. 219, % 9, 983 P.2d 1103. Lacking detail and
subsidiary facts, the Findings are legally insufficient. Even if they were explainable by
the evidence, which they are not, it is not this Court's role to comb through the record for
evidence that might support them.
Defendants also assert the trial judge was not obliged to make an affirmative
finding that the fire did not start in the southeast corner of the 436 Main building.
Appellees' Brief at 13. Where the fire started is the crux of the case. Fire fighters, eyewitnesses, fire marshals, and origin and cause experts agree the fire started at that comer.
Defendants' expert conceded that the only possible ignition source in the area was
defendants' energized cable. It must have ignited the fire, for nothing else could have.
The trial judge's failure to adequately resolve this issue renders the Findings legally
insufficient. See Estate ofAshton v. Ashton, 804 P.2d 540, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(stating failure to make findings on all material issues constitutes reversible error).
4.

Remand for New Trial is the Proper Remedy Here for the
Legally Insufficient Findings.

To remedy the lack of complete Findings this Court should order a new trial.
Ordinarily, the remedy for lack of complete findings is that "the appellate court will
remand the case for further proceedings." Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah
5

1998). The rationale behind this rale is that absent "adequate findings of fact, meaningful
review of a decision's evidentiary basis is virtually impossible." Woodward v. Fazzio,
823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In certain circumstances, however, a new trial
should be ordered.
In Ramirez, for example, this Court ordered a new trial when the trial court had
failed to produce adequate findings. 817 P.2d at 788. The trial court had erred by failing
to "address the factual questions and to make legal determinations that were a prerequisite
to the admission of the eyewitness identification essential to the conviction." Id. "To ask
the trial court to address the admissibility question now would be to tempt it to reach a
post hoc rationalization for the admission of pivotal evidence." Id. at 789. Consequently,
the Court held that "[t]he only fair way to proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction and
remand the matter for retrial." Id. Fairness in this case likewise demands a new trial.
A new trial may be proper when the original trier of fact is no longer available.
Acton, 737 P.2d at 999 (ordering new trial where trial judge had retired). The original
trier of fact here is no longer available, so the Court should order a new trial. Defendants
suggest this Court should remand this case to the original trial judge based on Rule 3108(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. That Rule does not authorize
such a reassignment. Rule 3-108 allows judicial assistance or judicial assignment for
limited reasons that are not applicable here. See Ut. R. J. Admin. R3-108(1). Defendants
also suggest that this case should be remanded to Judge Lewis. While she could review
the transcript, she would be at a serious disadvantage in her role as the fact finder that

6

would be prejudicial to appellants. She could not assess the witnesses' demeanor or their
credibility. Nor could she observe the witnesses illustrating their testimony with the
dozens of photographs and physical artifacts. Remanding the case to another judge for
new or supplemental Findings would be ineffective and unfair. The only fail* and
effective remedy for these insufficient Findings is new trial.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED THE RULE 41(b)
MOTION FOR INVOLUNTARY DISMISSAL.

Had the trial court properly considered only plaintiffs' evidence on the Rule 41(b)
Motion, no involuntary dismissal would have issued. Plaintiffs properly preserved the
issue of whether the trial court improperly granted defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion. The
trial court should not have granted defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion, because plaintiffs
established a prima facie case. Even if the trial court wished to dismiss on the grounds
that it was not persuaded by the evidence, such a dismissal could have been founded only
on a failure of persuasion by plaintiffs' evidence standing alone; the trial court could not
properly consider defendants' evidence when deciding whether plaintiffs' evidence was
persuasive. Finally, even if proper grounds for a Rule 41(b) dismissal had existed, the
trial court was still required to comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a) when
articulating its Findings. Failure to comply with those requirements calls for reversal.

7

1.

Plaintiffs Preserved the Issue of Whether the Trial Judge Erred
in Granting Defendants5 Motion for Nonsuit Under Rule 41(b) on
the Grounds that Plaintiffs had Failed to Establish a Prima Facie
Case,

Defendants define the issues as narrowly as possible in order to claim that
plaintiffs waived those issues. Defendants contend plaintiffs failed to preserve for appeal
the "issue" of whether the trial judge had improperly considered defendants' evidence in
deciding the issue of causation. Appellees' Brief at 15. That is not an issue on appeal,
but rather part of the discussion of the second main issue on appeal, namely, whether the
trial court erred in granting defendants' Rule 41(b) Motion at the close of plaintiffs' case
on the ground that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case. Appellants' Brief
at 1. Defendants do not contest that plaintiffs preserved this main issue, and rightfully so:
the record shows that plaintiffs' counsel argued on June 1, 2000 that the trial court should
not have granted the Rule 41(b) Motion, because plaintiffs had more than met the burden
necessary to establish a prima facie case. (R. 7396 at 1966.) Thus, because plaintiffs
preserved the issue of whether plaintiffs had made out a sufficient case to survive the
Rule 41(b) Motion for nonsuit, the Court should consider whether the trial court could
weigh defendants' evidence in ruling on the Rule 41(b) Motion.
Next, defendants argue plaintiffs waived the "issue" of whether the trial judge
could consider defendants' evidence on the Rule 41(b) Motion because plaintiffs did not
brief it in the Motion for New Trial. Appellees' Brief at 15. Defendants cite Brookside
Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968, as support. In Bwokside,
however, the Court stated that "once trial counsel has raised an issue before the trial
8

court, and the trial court has considered the issue, the issue is preserved for appeal." Id.
at f 14 (citing Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)). As
explained above, plaintiffs clearly argued to the trial court that it had improperly granted
the Rule 41(b) Motion because plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case. Therefore, this
second argument concerning waiver of the issue on appeal also fails.
Defendants' final argument concerning waiver is that by accommodating
defendants' request to put on evidence out of order before plaintiffs had rested, plaintiffs
waived any objection to the trial court considering the defendants' evidence in ruling on
the Rule 41(b) Motion. Appellee's Brief at 15. Plaintiffs cited no law to support this
argument. Indeed, it would be exceedingly unfair to construe plaintiffs' accommodation
to defendants as a waiver of any objection to how the trial court might consider a
potential Rule 41(b) Motion. At the time plaintiffs accommodated defendants' request to
put on evidence out of order, defendants had not made their Rule 41(b) Motion, and
plaintiffs had no reason to assume defendants would seek to take advantage of plaintiffs'
good faith accommodation. Thus, defendants' three waiver arguments fail, and the Court
should consider the merits of plaintiffs' assertion that the trial court should not have
granted the Rule 41(b) Motion.
2.

Neither of the Two Reasons For Dismissal Pursuant to Rule 41(b)
Applies to Justify the Trial Judge's Dismissal of Plaintiffs5 Case,

Neither a failure by plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case, nor a failure by
plaintiffs to persuade the trial court with plaintiffs' evidence, justifies the Rule 41(b)
dismissal, because the trial judge considered more than just plaintiffs' evidence when
9

granting the motion. "[R]ule 41(b) 'is appropriately applied when the trial judge finds
that the claimant has . . . failed to make out a prima facie case or when the trial judge is
not persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant"' Bair v. Axiom Design, L.L.C.,
2001 UT 20, \ 12, 20 P.3d 388 (quoting Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58, 60 (Utah 1987))
(emphasis supplied). Plaintiffs cited this clear holding in their initial Brief, see
Appellants' Brief at 29, and defendants did not take issue with its accuracy or
applicability. See Appellees' Brief at 14-17. Instead, defendants have simply fixated on
the fact that the trial judge did not use the words "prima facie" in his Findings, and
argued that this must mean the trial judge was unpersuaded by plaintiffs' evidence. See
Appellees' Brief at 14 (citing R. 7397-98 at 1976-77).
Defendants' argument that the trial court may consider the defendant's evidence
on a Rule 41(b) motion must fail. Appellees base their argument on this point on Deseret
Livestock v. Utah Power & Light Co., 541 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1975). Such a position is
fundamentally untenable, however, in light of the more recent cases of Bair v. Axiom
Design and Lemon v. Coates, which were decided in 2001 and 1987, respectively. As the
quotation from Bair above indicates, the key questions for the trial court on a Rule 41(b)
motion are whether (1) "the claimant has ...failed to make out a prima facie case'' or (2)
the court is "not persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimant." Bair, 2001 UT
20 at Tf 12 (emphasis supplied).
The concept of "prima facie" demands that when a trial court is determining
whether such a case exists, the trial court should consider the plaintiffs evidence alone,
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to see whether the plaintiff has built a case that can stand on its own in the absence of
contrary evidence. UA prima facie case has been made when evidence has been received
at trial that, in the absence of contrary evidence, would entitle the party having the
burden of proof to judgment as a matter of law." Bair, 2001 UT 20 at 1f 14 (emphasis
supplied). Thus, the issue of whether contrary evidence exists is beside the point for
purposes of a correct ruling on a Rule 41(b) motion, and has no bearing on whether a
prima facie case exists. This approach is consistent with the Bair court's second
articulation of the reason justifying granting a 41(b) motion: that the trial court was not
persuaded by the evidence "presented by the claimant" Id. at % 12 (emphasis supplied).
Moreover, this makes sense in light of the plain language of Rule 41(b), which states that
the grounds justifying granting the motion are that "the plaintiff h&s shown no right to
relief." Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P. (emphasis supplied).
Bair is quite analogous to the instant case. In Bair, the plaintiff argued that the
trial court had improperly dismissed its case on a Rule 41(b) motion because the plaintiff
had made out a prima facie case for breach of contact. Id. at ^ 11. The Court noted that
"the determination of whether a party has made out a prima facie case is a question of law
which we review for correctness, affording no deference to the trial court's judgment."
Id. at If 13. Next, the Court discussed the necessaiy elements of a breach of contract
claim, and found that plaintiffs had introduced sufficient evidence to establish those
elements. Id.

11

The defendant in Bair next made what is essentially defendants' argument in this
case:
[e]ven if [the plaintiff] did establish a prima facie right to relief, the trial
court's order of dismissal should nevertheless be upheld because under rule
41(b) a trial court may dismiss an action even if the plaintiff has established
a prima facie case, if the trial court is "not persuaded by the evidence
presented by the claimant."
Id. at \ 19. Likewise, defendants here argue that "the record demonstrates that the trial
judge simply was not persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimants" Appellees'
Brief at 14 (emphasis supplied). At the same time, however, defendants argue that the
trial court can consider the defendant's evidence on a Rule 41(b) motion. Id. at 16-17.
The critical problem is that the record does not demonstrate the trial judge's lack of
persuasion in the way Rule 41(b) says is necessary. Rule 41(b) states that the trial judge
"shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a)." Here, plaintiffs' lead argument is that
the Findings are legally insufficient because the trial judge failed to fulfill the
requirements of Rule 52(a). See Appellants' Brief at 26-28. The trial court simply found,
with no analysis or discussion, that "[t]he ADKS roof deicing cable was not the
proximate cause of the fire at 436 Main. . . ." (R. 6645, 6671). It cannot be
overemphasized that nothing in the Findings explains why the trial judge found the cable
was not the proximate cause of the fire. See Findings, R. 6639-45. In Bair, the trial
judge failed to comply with Rule 52(a), Bair, 2001 UT 20, \ 20, and so the Court found
that the trial judge had erred in granting the Rule 41(b) dismissal of the plaintiffs' case.
Id at f 21. Since this, too, is a situation where the trial court failed to comply with Rule
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52(a), the Court should find, as it did in Bair, that the trial court should not have ordered
an involuntary dismissal. Such an error calls for reversal Bair, 2001 UT 20,1f 21.
C.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE DEMONSTRATED THE TRIAL JUDGE'S
FINDINGS ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.

The Finding that the heat cable was not the cause of this fire is clearly erroneous.
Appellants' Brief at 38-43. Plaintiffs submitted overwhelming evidence that the fire's
origin was in the southeast corner of the 436 Main building. Defendants assert the trial
judge was not obliged to find another point of origin. Appellees' Brief at 34. However,
the question remains: if the fire did not start in the southeast comer, where did it start?
Defendants did suggest an alternative, but not precise, origin of the fire. There is no
credible evidence supporting this assertion.
Defendants' expert Mr. Russell opined that the fire probably began in the attic
above the showroom floor. (R. 7306 at p. 1521.) He also said the fire could have started
by electrical fault. (R. 7306 at p. 1522.) The trial judge may have relied upon Mr.
Russell's opinion. However, the overwhelming physical evidence and eyewitness
testimony indicates that this theoiy is impossible and clearly erroneous. First, this finding
ignores the fact that fire fighter Lee Terry, one of the first on the scene, cut a vent hole in
the showroom roof, and saw no fire in the attic where defendant's expert said would
have been the point of origin. (R. 7309 at p. 1539); Appellant's Brief at 39. Next, for
this opinion to be correct, the fire would have had to take an impossible course, burning
downhill instead of uphill, going through an exterior wall of the attic and down through a
dead space, continuing downhill through the chases, through the sheet rock fire stop, and
13

then through the fascia board, all before anyone saw the fire. (R. 7308 at p. 1538.);
Appellant's Brief at 39 (explaining detailed fire path according to Mr. Russell).
Given plaintiffs' substantial eyewitness and expert testimony concerning the origin
of this fire and defendants' failure to present a plausible alternative, the trial court's
finding that the fire did not originate in the southeast corner of the 436 Main building is
clearly erroneous. Admittedly, the parties' experts gave conflicting testimony on the
issue of causation. However, this conflicting testimony is insignificant given plaintiffs'
production of overwhelming evidence of the fire's origin. Every expert agreed that all
sources of ignition in the plaintiffs' area of origin, except the heat cable, were eliminated.
(R. 7301 at p. 1475). Again this point is critical: if plaintiffs are right about the fire's
origin, they are also right about the fire's cause. Nothing else could have logically started
this fire. Because the trial court's Findings are illogical and not supported by substantial
competent evidence, they are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, this Court should grant
plaintiffs a new trial.
D.

PLAINTIFFS PROPERLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE.

This Court has held "an Appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's findings are so
lacking as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" In re Estate ofBartell, 776
P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989). Plaintiffs have met this burden.
Here, plaintiffs played devil's advocate. Plaintiffs explained the basis for the trial
court's Findings and gathered all the evidence that supported those Findings, such as it is.
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See Appellants' Brief at 34-38. Plaintiffs presented defendants' evidence relating to
origin and cause in their opening brief.5 Defendants can marshal no probative substantial
material evidence pertaining to the challenged Findings that plaintiffs have not already
marshaled.
Plaintiffs first provided a summary of their evidence. Plaintiffs gathered this
evidence to give this Court sufficient facts to consider the importance for the trial court to
have made a specific finding as to origin and cause. In the Statement of Facts, plaintiffs
went into great depth to give the factual background for this Court to appreciate the scene
of the fire, the witnesses who testified, and the issues involved. This evidence as
marshaled shows plaintiffs established a prima facie case.6
Next, plaintiffs marshaled the evidence supporting the Findings. See Appellants'
Brief at 34-38. With respect to origin such evidence could have included: (1) the
southeast comer was not the area with the heaviest burn; (2) plaintiffs did not adequately
document the fire scene; (3) an available unburaed fuel load was found at plaintiffs'

5

Plaintiffs reiterate, "[t]here is, in effect no need for [them] to marshal the
evidence when the findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully
challenged as factual determinations." Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). When findings are legally insufficient, as they are in this case, plaintiffs
"need not engage in a futile marshaling exercise." Williamson v. Williamson, 823 P.2d
474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
Tlaintiffs have also gathered all the evidence supporting the trial court's Finding
related to origin and cause. Again, the evidence set forth in the Statement of Facts is
important for this Court in order to determine whether the Findings are clearly erroneous.
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source of origin; and (4) plaintiffs' experts could not determine a precise, down-to-thesquare-inch area of origin. With respect to cause such evidence could have included:
(1) the fault explained by plaintiffs' experts was not sufficient to ignite the cable's PVC,
and the tests used to demonstrate the fault were not representative of the actual conditions
of the fire; (2) defendants' experts testified that the electrical fault and ignition of the
PVC claimed by plaintiffs would not generate enough heat to start this fire; (3) the "heat
sink" effect explained by defendant's experts would not allow the fascia board to ignite;
(4) PVC is not a good ignition source; and (5) defendants' experts tried to attack the
credibility of plaintiffs' experts.7 No indication exists in the record, however, of what the
trial court relied on in making its Findings.
a.

The Evidence of Origin.

Defendants contend plaintiffs failed to marshal the evidence supporting the trial
court's Findings. Defendants claim plaintiffs' marshaling misses the critical points.
Defendants identify no evidence that plaintiffs failed to marshal.
Plaintiffs explained that defendants' experts testified that the origin of the fire was
not the southeast corner of the building. The trial court may have relied on that
testimony. See Appellants' Brief at 34-35; Appellees' Brief at 25-26 (both briefs citing to
R. 7594 at p. 1420). Defendants' experts testified the southeast corner was not the area
with the greatest fire damage. See Appellants' Brief at 34 n. 11; Appellees' Brief at 26
(both briefs citing R. 7594 at p. 1420 and 1423-24). Defendants' experts based this

7

This evidence is explained in more detail in Appellant's Brief p. 36-38.
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conclusion on the available fuel load at plaintiffs' area of origin. See Appellants' Brief at
34-35; Appellees' Brief at 26. Additionally, the rafters were more damaged toward the
uphill interior of the shed than toward the lower outside edge. See Appellants' Brief at
35; Appellees' Brief at 29 (both Briefs citing R. 7362 at p. 1826). Finally, defendants'
experts were not able to determine a precise area of origin because the building was
destroyed before they had a chance to examine it. See Appellants' Brief at 34; Appellees'
Brief at 25 and 27 (both briefs citing R. 7299 at p. 1460).
Next, the trial court may have relied upon defendants' claim that the plaintiffs'
could not prove a precise area of origin. See Appellants' Brief at 35; Appellees' Brief at
20-22. Fire Marshal Coleman identified the area as a small cubical area in the southeast
comer. See Appellants' Brief at 35 (referring to R. 7078); Appellees' Brief at 20
(referring to R. 7077 and R. 7081). Other experts explained the area of origin as "the
southeast corner just below the roof level," (R. 7078 at p. 203); see Appellants' Brief at
35; Appellees' Brief at 20, and the "area of origin" is an area two or three feet in
diameter. (R. 7188 at p. 799); see Appellants' Brief at page 35; Appellees' Brief at 21.
These points of origin included areas above and below the roofline. See Appellants'
Brief at 35; Appellees' Brief at 20.
All the evidence supporting the trial court's Finding that the fire did not originate
in the southeast comer has been adequately marshaled for this Court to consider.
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b.

Evidence Supporting Trial Court's Cause Evidence.

Plaintiffs marshaled the evidence supporting the trial court's Finding that the heat
cable was not the cause of the fire. First, the trial court may have found the heat cable
was not the cause of the fire based upon the testimony of Dr. Ogle. Dr. Ogle testified that
the fault explained by Dr. Kilgore was insufficient to ignite the PVC. See Appellants'
Brief at 36; Appellees' Brief at 29 (both refening to R. 7362 at p. 1832). Dr. Ogle
testified that the flame test used by Dr. Kilgore to ignite the fascia board was not
representative of the actual electrical fault. Appellants' Brief at 36. Dr Ogle testified the
electrical fault and subsequent ignition of the PVC could not generate enough heat to start
this fire. Appellant's Brief at 36 (refening to R. 7364 at p. 1848); Appellee's Brief at 30
(refening to R. 7363-7364 at pp. 1838-1841).
Next, the trial court may have relied upon the "heat sink" effect described by Dr.
Ogle in determining that the heat cable did not cause the fire. Dr. Ogle explained that
due to the "heat sink" effect, the electrical fault would not be able to ignite the fascia.
Appellants' Brief at 36; Appellees' Brief at31 (both refening to R. 7365 atp. 1849).
Fourth, the trial court may have relied upon the testimony of Dr. Ogle that PVC is not a
good ignition source. Dr. Ogle testified that PVC is naturally flame retardant.
Appellants' Brief at 37 (refening to R. 7359 at p. 1807); Appellees' Brief at 29 (refening
to R. 7362 at p. 1829. When he took the heat source away from the PVC, it would not
bum. Appellants' Brief at 36 (refening to R. 7362 at p. 1829); Appellees' Brief at 30
(refening to R. 7365 at pp. 1851-55). Defendants also argued that the type of sustained
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flame produced in plaintiffs' laboratoiy tests could not have ignited this fire. Appellant's
Brief at 37; Appellees' Brief at 31 (both referring to R. 7366 at p. 1860). Finally,
defendants picked at the credibility of plaintiffs' witness. For example, defendants'
expert Robert Becherer was critical of the testing methods used by Dr. Kilgore.
Appellants' Brief at 37; Appellees' Brief at 32-33 (both referring to R. 7314-7316 at pp.
1584-1606).
All the evidence supporting the trial court's Finding that the heat cable was not the
cause of the fire was adequately marshaled for this Court to consider.
E.

THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY
EVALUATING A STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM USING
NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES.

Utah law neither requires nor permits a court to determine the viability of a strict
liability cause of action based on evidence that goes to the issue of whether a
manufacturer acted negligently.
1.

Product History is Not Probative on the Issue of Design Defect

Defendants fail to respond in any way to plaintiffs's argument that according to
Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., "'proof that the manufacturer knew or should have known of the
defective condition ... [is] unnecessary under strict liability.'" Appellants' Brief at 44, 45
(quoting Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 36, | 13, 48 P.3d 218). See Appellees' Brief at
1-50 (omitting any discussion of Bishop v. GenTec). Instead, defendants simply argue
that the history of the cable is probative on the issue of design defect, because it goes to
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the issue of whether the cable was "unreasonably dangerous" pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-15-6. See Appellees' Brief at 35-37.
While it is true that evidence that bears on whether the cable is "unreasonably
dangerous" could be probative on the issue of whether the cable has a design defect, the
evidence of product history in this case only spoke to the issue of whether defendants had
notice of the defective condition—it did not speak to the issue of whether the cable was
unreasonably dangerous. That is because evidence concerning whether defendants knew
of any prior fires that had been caused by the cable is irrelevant to whether the cable was
safely designed or whether it was feasible to incorporate a GFCI.
Additionally, defendants argue—and plaintiffs agree—that evidence of the
"magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm" is relevant to a stiict
products liability claim. See Restatement (Third) Torts: Product Liability § 2, cmt. fat
22-27 (1998) ("Restatement Third"). Defendants go astray, however, when they attempt
to equate the product history evidence that was introduced with evidence of the
"magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm." Significantly, the
Restatement Third states neither that evidence of product history is relevant, nor that a
manufacturer's knowledge or lack of knowledge about prior accidents caused by the
product is relevant. See id.
The product history evidence here was much closer to "cproof that the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the defective condition,'" which, as this
Court explained in Bishop v. GenTec, is irrelevant in a stiict products liability action. See
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2002 UT 36, U 13. Plaintiffs have already made this argument, See Appellants' Brief at
44-45, but defendants have not attempted to argue a contrary position. Defendants have
failed to even assert that the product history evidence in this case was actually closer to
evidence of the "magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm." See
Appellees' Brief at 36-37. Rather, all defendants have done is assert that evidence of
"magnitude and probability of the foreseeable risks of harm" is admissible—a point with
which plaintiffs agree. See id
Plaintiffs do not urge the Court to find that product history evidence is
inadmissible in all strict product liability cases. Rather, plaintiffs simply urge the Court
to assess the product history evidence as it was presented in this particular case.
Defendants' lack of argument on the question of whether the product history evidence in
this case spoke more to the issue of defendants' notice than to the "magnitude and
probability of the foreseeable risks of harm" is a tacit concession that it was actually
inadmissible evidence of the defendants' notice.
2.

Evidence Regarding Whether a Product is "State of the Art" is
Irrelevant to a Strict Liability Case.

Plaintiffs have freely acknowledged that more courts have found state of the art
evidence relevant in strict liability cases than have found it irrelevant, but plaintiffs have
also pointed out that this Court has never spoken directly on the issue. Furthermore,
plaintiffs set forth reasoned arguments why this Court should find state of the art
evidence irrelevant, at least in this case. See Appellants' Brief at 45-47. In contrast,
however, the primary thrust of defendants' argument on this point is simply that this
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Court should follow what different courts have done. This fact alone does not amount to
a substantial reason for the Court to choose one legal path over another, especially in
light of the fact that plaintiffs have presented solid reasons supporting their position that
are grounded in both the well-established legal and public policy principles that underlie
strict liability doctrine. See Id.
3.

CSA and NEC Standards Are Not Relevant to this Strict
Liability Claim.

Defendants attempt to justify the trial judge's consideration of CSA and NEC
standards by arguing that "[a]ll Judge Thome did was consider the evidentiary value of
compliance with such standards," and that "the standards are in the nature of state-of-theart-evidence." Appellees' Brief at 42. Plaintiffs agree. The problem is that like state of
the art evidence, evidence concerning compliance with CSA and NEC is relevant only to
claims bottomed in negligence. They are not relevant to claims based in strict liability.8
Finally, it bears repeating that Utah has not adopted the NEC with respect to
product designs, but rather only to "building construction, alteration, remodeling and

8

Contrary to defendants' assertions, plaintiffs have never conceded this point.
While plaintiffs have acknowledged that one court has found that compliance with private
standards such as CSA and NEC standards "holds, at most, 'some evidentiary value,'"
plaintiffs immediately followed that acknowledgment with citation to a different court
that "refused to give any weight" to such standards. See plaintiffs' Memo in Support of
Motion for New Trial at 17 (R. 6751) (quoting Silver v. National Presto Indus., Inc., 884
F.2d 1393 (6th Cir. 1989) mdPfeifferv. Eagle Mfg. Co., Ill F. Supp. 1141 (D. Kan.
1991)). Legal advocacy will take a turn for the worse if a party is deemed to have
conceded a point when that party has simply informed the court of conflicting authority.
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repair." Utah Code Ann. § 58-56-4(2). The NEC is therefore not a government standard
that applies to product safety and design.
4.

Judge Thome's Error in Considering this Evidence was Not
Harmless.

As explained above, the trial court should not have considered negligence-oriented
evidence on a strict liability claim. The fact that it did led it to dismiss plaintiffs' claim.
This is the very definition of harmful error. Defendants' arguments to the contrary
amount to little more than a listing of what defendants perceive as other weaknesses in
plaintiffs' case. Importantly, defendants make no effort to argue that the trial court's
consideration of evidence of product history, state of the art, and CSA and NEC standards
was insufficient to lead to the trial court's decision. See Appellees' Brief at 42-45. Thus,
they concede that they needed the inadmissible evidence to convince the court. His
reliance on it was consequently harmful error.
F.

The Trial Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the
Warnings Claim.

Defendants attempt to pass off Mr. Harvey Fowler's reliance on the cable's
deficient warnings as an insignificant detail, and simply reiterate the hollow argument
that since Mr. Fowler did not carefully read the warnings, he could not have relied on
them. Easy Heat's argument on this issue, however, does nothing to actually address the
issue head-on. The question for this Court is whether a person can rely on warnings
when the person simply glances at or looks over the warnings without carefully reading
them. This is a substantial issue that the Court should address.
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If, as plaintiffs have argued, Mr. Fowler did rely on the warnings, then the trial
court's decision to grant summary judgment on the warnings claim was clearly in error,
because it would mean that there was a genuine issue of material fact with regard to
whether the deficient warnings proximately caused the fire.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court should reverse and remand for a new trial on the
merits.
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